摘要

审计师独立性一直是会计研究中一个重要的问题。长期以来，关于经济依赖、客户重要性、低价承揽、审计师任期、非审计服务、法律责任、声誉等因素对审计师独立性的影响，一直是理论和实证研究有争议的问题，同时监管部门也存在不同的看法和不同的监管政策。本书在已有相关研究的基础上，首先概括并提炼出了一个完整的审计师选聘权配置框架，进而，分别以完全竞争、垄断竞争和寡头垄断竞争为审计环境，建立了审计师选聘权配置、审计市场竞争与审计师独立性的一个完整分析框架，揭示了审计师选聘权配置、审计市场竞争与审计师独立性的内在关系，并据此对经济依赖、低价承揽、审计师任期、非审计服务、法律责任、声誉等是如何影响审计师独立性的一系列问题给出了一个分析性证明和结论。结论表明，经济依赖、低价承揽、审计师任期、非审计服务、法律责任、声誉等对审计师独立性的影响，取决于审计市场中审计师选聘权配置状况、审计师的声誉分布、审计市场竞争激烈程度、对审计师的监管等因素的综合作用。在具有个体多样性和复杂性的审计师群体中，对不同结构群体样本的实证分析也自然会存在不同甚至相反的结论。其次，基于该分析框架，本书提出了在不同的审计师选聘权配置下，审计师会形成不同的进化稳定策略，进而形成不同的独立审计习惯和规则，同时在审计师选聘权配置的演化过程中，独立审计的发展存在强烈的历史路径依赖。最后，本书运用该分析框架对我国审计师行业发展变迁给出了新的理论解释和相应的政策建议。

Abstract

Auditor independence has always been an important issue in accounting research. For a long time，the issue of economic dependence，clientimportance，low-balling，auditor tenure，non-audit service，legal liability，reputation and other factors on the auditor independence has beencontroversial in theoretical and empirical research，while regulators also have different views and different regulatory policies. On the basis of theexisting research，firstly，this book summarizes and extracts a complete framework for the selection rights of auditors and then based on thecomplete competition，monopolistic competition and oligopoly competition as the audit environment，a complete analysis framework of auditorselection rights disposition，audit market competition and auditor independence is established，which reveals the internal relationship between theauditor selection rights disposition，the market competition and the auditor independence，It also provides an analytical proof and conclusion fora series of problems such as economic dependence，low-balling，auditor tenure，non-audit service，legal liability，reputation and so on how toaffect the auditor independence. The results show that the impact of economic dependence，low-balling，auditor tenure，non-audit service，leg-al liability，reputation on the auditor independence depends on the auditor selection rights disposition，the distribution of reputation，the degreeof competition，the supervision of auditors and other factors combined effect. For the group of auditors with individual diversity and complexity，empirical studies of samples from different groups will naturally lead to different conclusions. Secondly，based on this analysis framework，thisbook suggests that under the disposition of different auditor selection rights，the auditors will form different evolutionary stability strategies andlead to the formation of different independent audit habits and rules. There is a strong historical path dependence in the development of theauditing system. Finally，this book uses the analytical framework to give a new theoretical explanation and corresponding policy advice to the auditindustry development.